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The Adaptive Dynamics Network at
IIASA fosters the development of new
mathematical and conceptual tech-
niques for understanding the evolution
of complex adaptive systems.
Focusing on these long-term implica-
tions of adaptive processes in systems
of limited growth, the Adaptive Dy-
namics Network brings together scien-
tists and institutions from around the
world with IIASA acting as the central
node.
Scientific progress within the network
is reported in the IIASA Studies in
Adaptive Dynamics series.
THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS NETWORK
The pivotal role of evolutionary theory in life sciences derives from its capability to
provide causal explanations for phenomena that are highly improbable in the physico-
chemical sense. Yet, until recently, many facts in biology could not be accounted for in
the light of evolution. Just as physicists for a long time ignored the presence of chaos,
these phenomena were basically not perceived by biologists.
Two examples illustrate this assertion. Although Darwin’s publication of “The Origin
of Species” sparked off the whole evolutionary revolution, oddly enough, the popula-
tion genetic framework underlying the modern synthesis holds no clues to speciation
events. A second illustration is the more recently appreciated issue of jump increases
in biological complexity that result from the aggregation of individuals into mutualistic
wholes.
These and many more problems possess a common source: the interactions of individ-
uals are bound to change the environments these individuals live in. By closing the
feedback loop in the evolutionary explanation, a new mathematical theory of the evolu-
tion of complex adaptive systems arises. It is this general theoretical option that lies at
the core of the emerging field of adaptive dynamics. In consequence a major promise
of adaptive dynamics studies is to elucidate the long-term effects of the interactions
between ecological and evolutionary processes.
A commitment to interfacing the theory with empirical applications is necessary both
for validation and for management problems. For example, empirical evidence indi-
cates that to control pests and diseases or to achieve sustainable harvesting of renewable
resources evolutionary deliberation is already crucial on the time scale of two decades.
The Adaptive Dynamics Network has as its primary objective the development of mathe-
matical tools for the analysis of adaptive systems inside and outside the biological realm.
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Abstract
Minigames capturing the essence of Public Goods experiments show that even in the
absence of rationality assumptions, both punishment and reward will fail to bring
about prosocial behaviour. This holds in particular for the well-known Ultimatum
Game, which emerges as a special case. But reputation can induce fairness and coop-
eration in populations adapting through learning or imitation. Indeed, the inclusion
of reputation effects in the corresponding dynamical models leads to the evolution of
economically productive behaviour, with agents contributing to the public good and
either punishing those who don’t, or rewarding those who do. Reward and punish-
ment correspond to two types of bifurcation with intriguing complementarity. The
analysis suggests that reputation is essential for fostering social behaviour among
selfish agents, and that it is considerably more effective with punishment than with
rewards.
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Reward and Punishment in Minigames
Karl Sigmund
Christoph Hauert
Martin A. Nowak
1 Introduction
Experimental economics relies increasingly on simple games to exhibit behaviour
which is blatantly at odds with the assumption that players are uniquely attempting
to maximize their own utility [1, 2, 3, 4]. We briefly describe two particularly
well-known games which highlight the prevalence of fairness and solidarity, without
delving into experimental details and variations.
In the Ultimatum Game, the experimenter offers a certain sum of money to two
players, provided they can split it among themselves according to specific rules. One
randomly chosen player (the proposer) is asked to propose how to divide the money.
The co-player (the responder) can either accept this proposal, in which case the
money is accordingly divided; or else the responder can reject the offer, in which
case both players get nothing. The game is not repeated. Since a ’rational’ responder
ought to accept any offer, as long as it is positive, a selfish proposer who thinks that
the responder is rational, in this sense, should offer the minimal positive sum. As
has been well documented in many experiments, this is not how humans behave, in
general. Many proposers offer close to one half of the sum, and responders who are
offered less than one-third often reject the offer [5, 6].
In the Public Goods Game, the experimenter asks each of N players to invest
some amount of money into a common pool. This money is then multiplied by a
factor r (with 1 < r < N) and divided equally among the N players, irrespective of
their contribution. The selfish strategy is obviously to invest nothing, since only a
fraction r
N
< 1 of each contribution returns to the donor. Nevertheless, a sizeable
proportion of players invest a substantial amount. This economically productive
tendency is further enhanced if the players, after the game, are allowed to impose
fines on their co-players. These fines must be paid to the experimenter, not to the
punisher. In fact, imposing a fine costs a certain fee to the punisher (which also goes
to the experimenter). Punishing is therefore an unselfish activity. Nevertheless, even
in the absence of future interactions, many players are ready to punish free riders,
and this has the obvious effect of increasing the contributions to the common pool
[3, 4, 7, 8, 9, for the role of punishment in animal societies see [10]].
Simple as they are, both games have a large number of possible strategies. For
the Ultimatum Game, these consist in the amount offered (when proposer) or the
aspiration level (when responder): any amount below the aspiration level is rejected.
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For the Public Goods Game with Punishment, the strategies are defined by the size
of the contribution and the fines meted out to the co-players. In order to achieve
a better theoretical understanding, it is useful to reduce these simple games even
further, and to consider minigames with binary options only. In doing this, we are
following a distinguished file of predecessors [5, 11, 12]. We shall then use the results
from Gaunersdorfer et al. [13] (see also[14, 15]) to analyse these games by studying
the corresponding replicator dynamics. It turns out that the Ultimatum minigame
is just a special case of the Public Goods with Punishment minigame. Evolutionary
game theory predicts – like the classical theory – the selfish, ’rational’ outcome. But
if an arbitrarily small reputation effect is included in the analysis, a bifurcation of
the dynamics allows for an outcome which is more ‘social’ and closer to what is
actually observed in experiments.
We analyse similarly a minigame describing the Public Goods Game with Re-
wards (in which case the recipient of a gift has the option of returning part of it
to the donor). Again, evolutionary game theory and classical theory predict the
selfish outcome: no gifts and no rewards. This time the corresponding reputation
effect introduces another type of bifurcation. The outcome is more complex and less
stable than in the punishment case.
It is tempting to suggest that this reflects why, in experiments, results obtained
by including rewards are considerably less pronounced than those describing pun-
ishment (Ernst Fehr, personal communication). We concentrate in this note on the
mathematical aspects of the minigames, but we argue in the discussion that reduc-
tion to a minigame is also interesting for experimenters, because the options are
more clear-cut.
2 Public Goods with Punishment
For the minigame reflecting the Public Goods Game, we shall assume that there are
only two players, and that both can send a gift g to their co-player at a cost −c to
themselves, with 0 < c < g. The players have to decide simultaneously whether to
send the gift to their co-player or not. They are effectively engaged in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. We continue to call it a Public Goods game, although the reduction to
two players may affect an essential aspect of the game.
After this interaction, they are offered the opportunity to punish their co-player
by imposing a fine. The fine amounts to a loss −β to the punished player, but it
entails a cost −γ to the punisher. Defecting and refusing to punish is obviously the
dominating solution.
If we assume that players can impose their fine conditionally, fining only those
who have failed to help them, the long-term outcome will still be the same as before:
no pro-social behaviour emerges. Indeed, let us label with e1 those players who
cooperate by sending a gift to their co-player, and with e2 those who don’t, i.e. who
defect; similarly, let f1 denote those who punish defectors, and f2 those who don’t.
The payoff matrix is given by
f1 f2
e1 −c, g −c, g
e2 −β,−γ 0, 0
(1)
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Here, the first number in each entry is the payoff for the corresponding row player,
and the second number for the column player.
For the minigame corresponding to the Ultimatum Game, we normalise the sum
to be divided as 1, and assume that proposers have to decide between two offers
only, a high and a low one. Thus proposers have to choose between option e1 (high
offer h) and e2 (low offer l) with 0 < l < h < 1. Responders are of two types, namely
f1 (accept high offers only) and f2 (accept every offer). In this case the payoff matrix
is
f1 f2
e1 1− h, h 1− h, h
e2 0, 0 1− l, l
(2)
3 A Minicourse on Minigames
More generally, let us assume that players are in two roles I and II , such that
players in role I interact only with players in role II and vice-versa. Let there be
two possible options e1 and e2 in role I, and f1 and f2 in role II, and let the payoff
matrix be
f1 f2
e1 A, a B, b
e2 C, c D, d
(3)
If players find themselves in both roles, their strategies are G1 = e1f1, G2 = e2f1,
G3 = e2f2 and G4 = e1f2. This yields a symmetric game, and the payoff for a player
using Gi against a player using Gj is given by the (i, j)-entry of the matrix
M =


A+ a A+ c B + c B + a
C + a C + c D + c D + a
C + b C + d D+ d D + b
A+ b A+ d B + d B + b

 (4)
For instance, a G1-player meeting a G3-opponent plays e1 against the opponents
f2, and obtains B, and plays f1 against the opponents e2, which yields c. In the
Public Goods with Punishment minigame, the two roles are that of potential donor
and of potential punisher, and both players play both roles. In the Ultimatum
Game, a player plays only one role, and the co-player the other: but since they find
themselves with equal probability in one or the other role, we only have to multiply
the previous matrix with the factor 1/2 to get the expected payoff values. We shall
omit this factor in the following.
We turn now to the standard version of evolutionary game theory, where we
consider a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game.
We denote by xi(t) the frequency of strategy Gi at time t, and assume that these
frequencies change according to the success of the strategies. Thus the state x =
(x1, x2, x3, x4) (with xi ≥ 0 and
∑
xi = 1) evolves in the unit simplex S4. The
average payoff for strategy Gi is (Mx)i. We shall assume a particularly simple
learning mechanism, and postulate that the rate according to which a Gi-player
switches to strategy Gj is proportional to the payoff difference (Mx)j− (Mx)i (and
is 0 if the difference is negative). We then obtain the replicator equation [14, 16, 17]
3
x˙i = xi[(Mx)i − M¯ ] (5)
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where M¯ =
∑
xj(Mx)j is the average payoff in the population. It
is well known that the dynamics does not change if one modifies the payoff matrix
M by replacing mij by mij −m1j. Thus, we can use instead of (4) the matrix
M =


0 0 0 0
R R S S
R + r R + s S + s S + r
r s s r

 (6)
where R = C − A, r = b − a, S = D − B and s = d − c. Alternatively, we could
have normalised the payoff matrix (3) to
f1 f2
e1 0, 0 0, r
e2 R, 0 S, s
(7)
The matrix M has the property that m1j + m3j = m2j + m4j for each j, so that
(Mx)1+(Mx)3 = (Mx)2+(Mx)4 for all x. From this follows that (x1x3)/(x2x4) is
an invariant of motion for the replicator dynamics: the value of this ratio remains
unchanged along every orbit. Hence the interior of the state simplex S4 is foliated
by the invariant surfaces WK = {x ∈ S4 : x1x3 = Kx2x4}, with 0 < K <∞. Each
such saddle-like surface is spanned by the frame G1−G2−G3−G4−G1 consisting
of four edges of S4. The orientation of the flow on these edges can easily be obtained
from the previous matrix. For instance, if R = 0, then the edge G1G2 consists of
fixed points. If R > 0, the flow points fromG1 towards G2 (G2 dominates G1 in the
absence of the other strategies), and conversely from G2 to G1 if R < 0. Similarly,
the orientation of the edge G2G3 is given by the sign of s, that of G3G4 by the sign
of S and that of G4G1 by the sign of r.
Generically, the parameters R, S, r and s are non-zero. This corresponds to 16
orientations of G1G2G3G4 which, by symmetry, can be reduced to 4. In Gauners-
dorfer et al. [13], all possible dynamics for the generic case have been classified.
4 Public Goods with Punishment and Ultimatum
Minigames
If we apply this to the Public Goods with Punishment minigame, we find R = c−β,
S = c, r = 0 and s = γ. For the Ultimatum minigame, we get R = −(1 − h),
S = h− l, r = 0 and s = l.
In fact, the Ultimatum minigame is a Public Goods minigame, with l = γ,
β = 1− l, and g = c = h− l. Intuitively, this simply means that in the Ultimatum
minigame, the gift consists in making the high offer instead of the low offer. The
benefit to the recipient (i.e. the responder) h − l is equal to the cost to the donor
(i.e. the proposer). The punishment consists in refusing the offer. This costs the
responder the amount l (which had been offered to him) and punishes the proposer
by the amount 1− l, which can be large if the offer has been dismal.
4
We can therefore concentrate on the Public Goods minigame. Note that it is non-
generic (r is zero). This is due to the fact that the punishment option is excluded
after a cooperative move (and in the Ultimatum minigame, no responder rejects the
high offer).
In the interior of S4 (more precisely, whenever x2 > 0 or x3 > 0) we have (Mx)4 >
(Mx)1 and hence x4/x1 is increasing. Similarly x3/x2 is increasing. Therefore,
there is no fixed point in the interior of S4. Thus the fixed points in WK are the
corners Gi and the points on the edge G1G4. In order to check which of these are
Nash equilibria, it is enough to check whether they are saturated. We note that
a fixed point z is said to be saturated if (Mz)i ≤ M¯ for all i with zi = 0. G3 is
saturated, G2 is not. A point x on the edge G1G4 is saturated whenever (Mx)3 ≤
[x1(Mx)1 + (1− x1)(Mx)4], i.e. whenever X1 ≥ c/β (using (Mx)4 = (Mx)1). The
condition (Mx)2 ≤ M¯ reduces to the same inequality. Thus if c > β, G3 is the only
Nash equilibrium. This case is of little interest.
From now on, we restrict our attention to the case c < β: the fine costs more
than the cooperative act. We note that this is always satisfied for the Ultimatum
minigame, and for public transportation. We denote the point (c/β, 0, 0, (β − c)/β)
with Q and see that the closed segment QG1 consists of Nash equilibria.
In this case, R < 0, and the orientation of the edges of WK is given by figure 1.
On the edge G2G4 there exists another fixed point F = (0, c/(β + γ), 0, (β + γ −
c)/(β + γ)). It is attracting on the edge, and in the face G2G4G1, but repelling on
the face G2G4G3. Finally, there is also a fixed point on the edge G1G3, namely the
point P = ((c+γ)/(β+γ), 0, (β− c)/(β+γ), 0). It is attracting in the face spanned
by that edge and G2, but repelling in the face spanned by that edge and G4. In the
absence of other strategies, the strategies G1 and G3 are bistable. The strategy G1
is risk dominant (i.e. it has the larger basin of attraction) iff 2c < β − γ. We note
that in the special case of the Ultimatum minigame, this reduces to the condition
h < 1/2.
Apart from G3 and the segment QG1 there are no other Nash equilibria. De-
pending on the initial condition, orbits in the interior of S4 converge either to G3 or
to a Nash equilibrium on QG1. Selective forces do not act on the edge G1G4, since
it consists of fixed points only. But the state x fluctuates along the edge by neutral
drift (reflecting random shocks of the system). Random shocks will also introduce
occasionally a minority of a missing strategy. If this happens while x is in QG1,
selection will send the state back to the edge, but a bit closer to Q (since x4/x1
increases). Once the state has reached the segment QG4 and a minority of G3 is
introduced by chance, this minority will be favoured by selection and eventually
become fixed in the population. Thus in spite of the segment of Nash equilibria, the
asocial state G3 will get established in the long run. This result plays the central
role in Nowak et al. [18].
5 Bifurcation through Reputation
In the Ultimatum Game and the Public Goods Game, experiments are usually per-
formed under conditions of anonymity. The players do not know each other and
are not supposed to interact again. But let us now introduce a small probability
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Figure 1: Public Goods with Punishment but without Reputation. (a) Dynamics on the
four faces of the simplex S4 and (b) on the invariant manifoldWK with K = 1. The edge
G1G4 is line line of fixed points. On G1Q they are stable (filled circles) and on QG4
unstable (open circles). In addition, there are two saddle points P and F on the edges
G1G3 and G2G4. The social state G1 (donations and punishment) and the asocial state
G3 (no gifts, no punishment) are both stable. However, random shocks eventually drive the
system to the asocial equilibrium G3. Parameters: c = 1, g = 3, β = 2, γ = 1, µ = ν = 0.
that players know the reputation of their co-player, and in particular, whether the
co-player has failed to punish a defector on some previous occasion. This creates a
temptation to defect.
Let us assume that with a probability µ, cooperators (e1-players) defect against
non-punishers (f2-players), i.e. µ is the probability that (1) the f2-type becomes
known and (2) the e1-type decides to defect. Let us similarly assume that with a
small probability ν, defectors (e2-players) cooperate against punishers (f1-players),
i.e. ν is the probability that (1) the f1-type becomes known and (2) the e2-type de-
cides to cooperate. The payoff matrix for this ’Public Goods with Second Thoughts’
minigame becomes
f1 f2
e1 −c, g −c(1− µ), g(1− µ)
e2 −(1− ν)β − νc,−(1− ν)γ + νg 0, 0
(8)
We obtain R = (1 − ν)(c − β) < 0, S = c(1 − µ) > 0, s = γ − ν(g + γ) which is
positive for small ν and r = −gµ < 0. Thus the edge G1G4 consists no longer of
fixed points, but of an orbit converging to G1. This is a generic situation, and we
can use the results from Gaunersdorfer et al. [13].
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The fixed points in the interior of S4 must satisfy (Mx)1 = (Mx)2 = (Mx)3 =
(Mx)4 (and, of course x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1). There exists now a line L of fixed
points in the interior of S4, satisfying (Mx)1 = (Mx)2, which reduces to
x1 + x2 = S/(S −R) (9)
and also satisfying (Mx)1 = (Mx)4 which reduces to
x1 + x4 = s/(s − r) (10)
This yields solutions in the simplex S4 if and only if RS < 0 and rs < 0. Both
conditions are satisfied for the new minigame. It is easily verified that the line of
fixed points L is given by li = mi + p for i = 1, 3, and li = mi − p for i = 2, 4, with
p as parameter and
m =
1
(S −R)(s − r)
(Ss,−Sr,Rr,−Rs) (11)
(see figure 5). Setting ν = 0 for simplicity, this yields in our case
m =
1
(γ + gµ)(β +−cµ)
(cγ(1− µ), bcµ(1− µ), bµ(β − c), γ(β − c)) (12)
and reduces for the Ultimatum minigame to
m = k−1(l(h− l)(1− µ), (h− l)2µ(1− µ), (h− l)(1− h)µ, l(1− h)) (13)
with k = (1− l− µ(h − l))(l + µ(1− l)). This line passes through the quadrangle
G1G2G3G4 and hence intersects every WK in exactly one point (it intersects W1
in m). Because Rr > 0, this point is a saddle point for the replicator dynamics in
the corresponding WK (see figure 2). On each surface, and therefore in the whole
interior of S4, the dynamics is bistable, with attractors G1 and G3. Depending
on the initial condition, every orbit, with the exception of a set of measure zero,
converges to one of these two attractors (see figure 2).
For µ→ 0 the point m, and consequently all interior fixed points (which are all
Nash equilibria) converge to the point Q. At µ = 0 we observe a highly degenerate
bifurcation. The (very short) segment of fixed points is suddenly replaced by a
transversal line of fixed points, namely the edgeG1G4, of which one segment, namely
QG1, consists of Nash equilibria.
Thus, introducing an arbitrarily small perturbation µ (which is proportional to
the probability of having information about the other player’s punishing behaviour)
changes the long term state of the population. Instead of converging in the long
run to the asocial regime G3 (defect, don’t punish), the dynamics has now two
attractors, namely G3 and the social regime G1 (cooperate, punish defectors). For
small µ and ν, this new attractor is even risk-dominant (in the sense that it has the
larger basin of attraction on the edge G1G3) provided 2c < β − γ, which for the
Ultimatum case reduces to h < 1/2. One can argue that in this case, random shocks
(or diffusion) will favour the social regime.
If µ = 1, i.e. if there is full knowledge about the type of the co-player, we obtain
S = 0. This yields in some way the mirror image of the case µ = 0. G3G4 is now the
fixed point edge, the points on QˆG3 are Nash (with Qˆ = (0, 0, g/(g + γ), γ/(g+ γ))
if we assume additionally that ν = 0) and fluctuations send the state ultimately to
the unique other Nash equilibrium, namely G1, the social regime.
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Figure 2: Public Goods with Punishment and Reputation. (a) Dynamics on the four
faces of the simplex S4 and (b) on the invariant manifold WK with K = 1. Introducing
reputation produces a bistable situation. Depending on the initial configuration, the
system ends up either close to the asocial equilibrium G3 or near the social equilibrium
G1. Replacing the line of fixed points G1G4 (see figure 1), a transversal line of fixed
points L runs through S4 and intersects WK in m (see figure 5). The position of m
depends on the parameters and determines which corner, G1 or G3, corresponds to the
’risk dominant’ solution. Parameters: c = 1, g = 3, β = 2, γ = 1, µ = 0.1, ν = 0.1.
6 Reward and Reputation
Let us now consider another minigame, a variant of Public Goods with Second
Thoughts, where reward replaces punishment. More precisely, two players are si-
multaneously asked whether they want to send a gift to the co-player (as before,
the benefit to the recipient is g, and the cost to the donor −c). Subsequently, re-
cipients have the possibility to return a part of their gift to the donor. We assume
that this costs them −γ and yields β to the co-player (if γ = β this is simply a
payback). We assume 0 < c < β and 0 < γ < g. We label the players who reward
their donor with f1 and those who don’t with f2. We shall assume that with a small
likelihood µ, cooperators defect if they know that the other player is not going to
reward them, i.e. µ is the probability that (1) the f2-type becomes known and (2)
the e1-type decides to defect. Similarly, we denote by ν the small likelihood that
defectors cooperate if they know that they will be rewarded. (ν is the probability
that (1) the f1-type becomes known and (2) the e2-type reacts accordingly). This
yields the payoff matrix
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Figure 3: Public Goods with Reward but without Reputation. (a) Dynamics on the four
faces of the simplex S4 and (b) on the invariant manifold WK with K = 1. The edge
G2G3 is a line of fixed points, stable on G3Q (closed circles) and unstable on QG2 (open
circles). Random shocks eventually drive the system to the stable asocial segment G3Q,
where no one makes any gifts but some players would reward a gift-giver. Parameters:
c = 1, g = 3, β = 2, γ = 1, µ = ν = 0.
f1 f2
e1 β − c, g − γ −c(1− µ), g(1− µ)
e2 (β − c)ν, (g − γ)ν 0, 0
(14)
Now R = (c− β)(1− ν) < 0, S = c(1− µ) > 0, r = γ − gµ which is positive if µ is
small, and s = (γ − g)ν, which is negative.
If ν = 0 (no clue that the co-player rewards), thenG2G3 consists of fixed points.
As before, we see that the saturated fixed points (i.e. the Nash equilibria) on this
edge form the segment QG3, (with Q = (0, c/β, (β − c)/β, 0) if µ is also 0). But
now, the flow along the edges leads from G2 to G1, from there to G4, and from
there to G3. All orbits in the interior have their α-limit on G2Q and their ω-limit
on QG3. If a small random shock sends a state from the segment G2Q towards the
interior, the replicator dynamics first amplifies the frequencies of the new strategies,
but then eliminates them again, leading to a state on QG3. If a small random shock
sends a state from the segment QG3 towards the interior, the replicator dynamics
sends it directly back to a state which is closer to G3. Eventually, with sufficiently
many random shocks, almost all orbits end up close to G3, the asocial state (see
figure 3).
For ν > 0, the flow on the edge G2G3 leads towards G3, so that the frame
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Figure 4: Public Goods with Reward and Reputation. (a) Dynamics on the four faces
of the simplex S4 and (b) on the invariant manifold WK with K = 1. Introducing repu-
tation destabilizes the asocial segment G3Q (see figure 3) leading to complex dynamical
behaviour. As before, the line of fixed points G2G3 is replaced by the transversal line
L running through S4 and intersecting WK in m. For K = 1, periodic orbits appear
with a center in m. Depending on the parameter values, ∆ determines the dynamics on
WK for K 	= 1. If ∆ < 0, then for K < 1, m turns into a source and the state spirals
towards the heteroclinic cycle G1G2G3G4 and for K > 1, m becomes a sink and all
states spiral inwards and converge to m. If ∆ > 0, the converse holds and for ∆ = 0 all
orbits are periodic. Small random shocks send the state from one manifold to another
and hence change the value of K. Therefore, the system never converges. Parameters:
c = 1, g = 3, β = 2, γ = 1, µ = 0.1, ν = 0.1.
spanning the saddle-type surfacesWK is cyclically oriented (see figure 4). As before,
there exists now a line L of fixed points in the interior of S4. The surfaceW1 consists
of periodic orbits. If ∆ := (β − γ)(1 − ν) + (g − c)(µ − ν) is negative, all non-
equilibrium orbits onWK , with 0 < K < 1 spiral away from this line of fixed points.
On WK they spiral towards the heteroclinic cycle G1G2G3G4. All non-equilibrium
orbits in WK , with K > 1 spiral away from that heteroclinic cycle and towards the
line of fixed points. If ∆ is positive, the converse holds. If ∆ = 0 (for instance if
β = γ and µ = ν) then all orbits off the edges and the line L of fixed points are
periodic. For ν → 0 this leads again to a highly degenerate bifurcation replacing a
one-dimensional continuum of fixed points (which shrinks towards Q as ν decreases)
by another, namely the edge G2G3.
We stress the highly unpredictable dynamics if ν > 0 and ∆ 	= 0. For one half
of the initial conditions, the replicator dynamics sends the state towards the line
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Figure 5: Invariant manifold WK for K = 1 in the simplex S4. (a) Without reputation
(µ = ν = 0), the line of fixed points L intersects the S4 in Q. (b) With reputation (µ > 0
and/or ν > 0) L runs through the interior of S4 and intersectsWK inm. The graphs refer
to the punishment scenario, but in the case of reward, an analogous bifurcation occurs on
the edge G2G3.
L of fixed points. But there, random fluctuations will eventually lead to the other
half of the simplex, where the replicator dynamics leads towards the heteroclinic
cycleG1G2G3G4. The population seems glued for a long time to one strategy, then
suddenly switches to the next, remains there for a still longer time etc... However, an
arbitrarily small random shock will send the state back into the half-simplex where
the state converges again to the line L of fixed points, etc. Not even the time average
of the frequencies of strategies converges. One can only say that the most probable
state of the population is either monomorphic (i.e. close to one corner of S4) or else
close to the attracting part of the line of fixed points (all four types present, the
proportion of cooperators larger among rewarders than among non-rewarders).
In this paper, we have concentrated on the replicator dynamics. There exist
other plausible game dynamics, for instance the best reply dynamics (see e.g. [14]),
where it is assumed that occasionally players switch to whatever is, among all pure
available strategies, the best response in the current state of the population. Berger
[19] has shown that almost all orbits converge in this case to m. We note that if the
values of µ and ν are small, the frequency x1 + x4 of gift-givers is small.
7 Discussion
If players are in two roles, with two options in each role, this is modelled by a
minigame. Such games lead to interesting dynamics on the simplex S4. The edges of
this simplex span a family of saddle-like surfaces which foliate S4. The orientation on
the edges are given by the payoff values, i.e. by the signs of R, S, r and s. Generically,
these numbers are all non-zero. But in many games, (especially among those given
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in extensive form) there exists one option where the payoff is unaffected by the type
of the other player. In the Public Goods with Punishment, this is the gift-giving
option: the co-player will never punish. In the Public Goods with Reward, it is the
option to withhold the gift: the co-player will never reward. In each case, one edge
of S4 consists of fixed points, one segment of it (from a point Q up to a corner Gi
of the edge) being made up of Nash equilibria. A small perturbation leading from a
point x on QGi into the interior of the simplex (i.e. introducing missing strategies)
is offset by the dynamics, i.e. the new strategies are eliminated again and the state
returns to QGi. But in one case, the state is closer to Q than before, in the other
case it is further away. The corresponding bifurcation replaces the fixed point on
that edge by a continuum of fixed points which, in one case, are saddle points (on
the invariant surface WK) and in the other case have complex eigenvalues. This
leads to rather distinct types of long-term behaviour – in one case, bistability, and
in the other case a highly complex and unpredictable oscillatory behaviour.
It is obviously easy to set up experiments where the reputation of the co-player is
manipulated. In particular, our model seems to predict that in the punishment treat-
ment, what is essential for the bifurcation is a non-zero likelihood (corresponding to
the parameter µ) that the cooperator believes that she is faced with a non-punisher.
What is essential for the bifurcation to happen in the rewards treatment, in contrast,
is that there is a non-zero likelihood (corresponding to the parameter ν) that the
defector believes that he is faced with a rewarder.
The possibly irritating message is that for promoting cooperative behaviour,
punishing works much better than rewarding. In both cases, however, reputation is
essential.
References
[1] Gintis, H. (2000) J.theor. Biol. 206, 169–179.
[2] Wedekind, C. & Milinski, M. (2000) Sience 288, 850–852.
[3] Fehr, E. & Ga¨chter, S. (1998) Europ. Econ. Rev. 42, 845–859.
[4] Kagel, J. H. & Roth, A. E, eds. (1995) The handbook of experimental economics.
(Princeton University Press, Princeton).
[5] Bolton, G. E. & Zwick, R. (1995) Games and Economic Behavior 10, 95–121.
[6] Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. & McEl-
reath, R. (2001) American Econ. Rev. in press.
[7] Gintis, H. (2000) Game Theory Evolving. (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton).
[8] Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. (2001) J. theor. Biol. in press.
[9] Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1992) Ethology and Sociobiology 13, 171–195.
[10] Clutton-Brock, T. H. & Parker, G. A. (1995) Nature 373, 209–216.
12
[11] Gale, J., Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. (1995) Games and Economic Behavior
8, 56–90.
[12] Huck, S. & Oechssler, J. (1996) Games and Econ. Behav. 28, 13–24.
[13] Gaunersdorfer, A., Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. (1991) Theor. Pop. Biol. 29,
345–357.
[14] Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dy-
namics. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[15] Cressman, R., Gaunersdorfer, A. & Wen, J. F. (2001) International Game
Theory Review in press.
[16] Schlag, K. (1998) J. Econ. Theor. 78, 130–156.
[17] Weibull, J. W. (1996) Evolutionary Game Theory. (MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass.).
[18] Nowak, M. A., Page, K. M. & Sigmund, K. (2000) Science 289, 1773–1775.
[19] Berger, U. (2001) Vienna University of Economics preprint.
13
